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Abstract: Contrastivists view ought-sentences as expressing 
comparisons among alternatives. Deontic actualists believe that the 
value of each alternative in such a comparison is determined by what 
would actually happen if that alternative were to be the case. One of the 
arguments that motivates actualism is a challenge to the principle of 
agglomeration over conjunction—the principle according to which if 
you ought to run and you ought to jump, then you ought to run and 
jump. I argue that there is no way of developing the actualist insight 
into a logic that invalidates the agglomeration principle without also 
invalidating other desirable patterns of inference. After doing this, I 
extend the analysis to other contrastive views that challenge 
agglomeration in the way that the actualist does. This motivates 
skepticism about the actualist’s way of challenging agglomeration.  
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CONSEQUENCE AND CONTRAST IN DEONTIC 
SEMANTICS. 
 
Ordinary speakers and theorists share the insight that sentences 
involving ought, like “Carla ought to run”, have an implicitly 
comparative nature. More precisely, the insight is that these sentences 
express comparisons between alternatives: one ought to run just in case 
running is better than the alternatives. Developing this insight into a 
theory requires an account of how the value of an alternative is 
determined. A prominent account has it that the value of an alternative 
is determined by what would happen if that alternative were the case. 
Translated into possible world talk, running is better than cycling just 
in case the closest world (to the actual world) in which one runs is 
better, in some salient way, than the closest world (to the actual world) 
in which one cycles.1 Frank Jackson calls this view ‘actualism’.2 
In “On the Semantics and Logic of Obligation”, Jackson (1985) 
motivates actualism on the basis of challenges to classical inference 
patterns for ought. Specifically, he targets the closure of ought under 
entailment and a principle of agglomeration over conjunction:  
 
Conjunctive Inheritance: ought(A & B) ⊨ ought(A)  																																																								
1 The view assumes that a relation of betterness among individual worlds is given as 
primitive. It also presupposes that it makes sense to refer to the closest world to the 
actual world. There is a familiar debate about the uniqueness assumption built into 
talk of “the closest world to the actual world.” Famously, the semantics in Lewis’s 
Counterfactuals (London: Blackwell, 1973) denies uniqueness, while Stalnaker’s 
presupposes it—see his “A theory of conditionals,” in Studies in Logical Theory, American 
Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series 2 (1968) 98–112. Jackson acknowledges the 
point on p. 185 of “On the Semantics and Logic of Obligation,” Mind 94 (1985), while 
also noting that the view can be modified to satisfy Lewisians. Indeed, Goble 
developed a version of this logic that does not presuppose uniqueness. See, Lou Goble 
“A logic of ‘good, should’ and ‘would’: Part I,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 19 (1990) 
169–199, Lou Goble “A logic of ‘good, should’ and ‘would’: Part II,” Journal of 
Philosophical Logic 19 (1990) 253–276, Lou Goble “The Logic of Obligation, ‘better’ 
and ‘worse’,” Philosophical Studies 70 (1993) 133–163. Like Jackson, however, I can 
convey all of my main points by focusing on the simpler version of the view. 
2 The conceptual roots of actualism are developed in Holly Smith Goldman “Dated 
rightness and moral imperfection,” in The Philosophical Review 85 (1974) 449–487 and 
Jordan Howard Sobel “Utilitarianism and Past and Future Mistakes,” in Noûs 10 
(1976) 195-219. To my knowledge, Jackson, op. cit., was the first to think of actualism 
as a semantic theory for the objective ought and to pose the question about the logic 
resulting from this theory. See also Jackson and Pargetter “Ought, Options and 
Actualism,” in The Philosophical Review 95 (1986) 233-255.  
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Agglomeration: ought(A), ought(B) ⊨ ought(A&B)  
 
Since the examples that motivate these challenges are controversial, the 
debate about actualism has focused on its motivation. As a result, the 
view is rarely developed and important conceptual gaps remain 
concerning how it ought to be developed.  
This paper explores one such gap. My central question is: how do 
standard accounts of logical consequence apply to the actualist semantic 
theory? 3  In particular, if logical consequence is understood as 
preservation of truth at a context, how should the actualist understand 
‘truth at a context’ for sentences involving ought?  
Filling out this gap is an essential part of the actualist agenda: after 
all, if actualism is motivated by claims about the unacceptability of 
certain inference patterns, it needs to make unequivocal predictions 
about the acceptability (or unacceptability) of inferences. One of the 
central results of this paper is that there are (at least) two very different 
ways of developing the main actualist principles into a notion of truth 
at a context. These yield radically different logics for ought.  
Ultimately, this analysis results in a challenge for actualists. I argue 
that there is no notion of consequence that is both theoretically 
satisfactory and compatible with the cases that motivate the actualist. 
In other words, any attempt to satisfy the actualist’s motivation (which 
I describe in §2) induces a logic for ought that is far weaker than the 
literature has acknowledged (this is the main result of §3). This is 
because the only logics that are fully compatible with the actualist’s 
motivation additionally invalidate a principle that ought to be valid, 
namely:  
 
Weakening: ought(A), ought(B) ⊨ ought(A ∨ B)  
 
The news for actualism is not all bad: I will show (§4) that there is a 
viable version of actualism that validates Weakening. However, it is 
only available if the actualist is willing to give up the challenge to 
Agglomeration.  
Having established these claims, I generalize the analysis beyond 
actualism. I consider two accounts of deontic ought that accept the 																																																								
3 I am not the first to pose this question. It is the subject of the important series of 
papers by Lou Goble I referenced in footnote 1 above. My analysis will emphasize 
different aspects of the subject matter than those illuminated by Goble’s. 
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contrastivist idea (the idea that ought-sentences express comparisons 
among alternatives), but not the actualist’s method for grounding such 
comparisons. The first account compares alternatives on the basis of 
their expected value. I show (§5) that this account shares the logical 
defects of the actualist semantics (it ends up invalidating Weakening). 
The second account, recently defended by Stephen Finlay, compares 
alternatives on the basis of their probability given that some salient end 
is realized. This account manages to invalidate Agglomeration while 
also validating Weakening. I will argue, however, that it lacks clear 
motivation for invalidating Agglomeration and cannot borrow the cases 
that motivate the actualist (§6).  
I BACKGROUND: TYPES OF OUGHT-SENTENCES  
This section and the next offer essential background. They may be 
skimmed by those who are familiar with the debate.  
It is traditional to draw a distinction between two kinds of ought-
sentences: those that specify what ought to be the case and those that 
specify what an agent (at a point in time, with a given body of 
information) ought to do.4 This distinction is not explicitly marked by 
the surface grammar of English. The sentence,  
 
(1) Joan ought to ski at Mt. Bachelor. 
 
is potentially ambiguous between a claim about what the world ought 
to be like (regardless of any agent’s deeds) and one that states what 
Joan ought to do. Following Jackson, I will primarily, though not 
exclusively, focus on ought-to-be interpretations.  
There is a second traditional distinction between subjective and 
objective ought. Roughly, one can distinguish between what Joan ought 
to do given her information (the ‘subjective’ reading) and what she 
ought to do given what in fact is the case (the ‘objective’ reading). These 
can come apart, for example, if Joan has misleading or insufficient 
information. Languages like English seem to allow both kinds of ought-
to-do sentences. In principle, though this is less often discussed, there 
should also be a parallel subjective/objective distinction for ought-to-be. 
After all, there is a clear distinction between what ought to be the case 																																																								
4 For one way of drawing this distinction, see Lloyd Humberstone “Two Sorts of 
Ought”, in Analysis 32 (1971) 8-11.  
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in light of someone’s (e.g. the speaker’s) information and what ought 
to be the case in light of some body of facts. Actualism is meant to be a 
theory of the objective ought.  
Finally, it is widely accepted that ought-sentences are context 
sensitive in a special way. Even if one focuses on a particular reading of 
(1), say the subjective ought-to-do reading, there is still no fixed, context-
independent source of value to ground the ought-judgment. In some 
contexts, a speaker who uttered (1) may intend to convey that it is true 
because Joan’s family will be at Mt. Bachelor and Joan wants to be with 
them. In other contexts, the speaker might mean that she needs to be 
in Eugene next week and wants to ski over the week-end. Kratzer 
famously interprets phenomena like this as instances of context 
dependence.5 The different interpretations arise from the value of a 
contextual parameter that records the relative priority of worlds (she 
calls this the ‘ordering source’). Some of the views I consider here do 
not agree with the use of ordering sources, but they all accept the 
underlying indeterminacy in ought-sentences.  
II BACKGROUND: DEONTIC ACTUALISM 
Deontic actualism is a kind of contrastivism. Contrastivism is the thesis 
that ought-sentences have their truth-conditions relative to a class of 
alternatives. That is, the semantic value of ⌜ought A⌝  is only fixed 
relative to a class of alternatives to the proposition that A. I use ‘the 
proposition that A’ as a term of art for ‘the set of worlds in which A is 
true’. In the following, I use bold letters A, B, C to denote the set of 
worlds at which sentences A, B, C (respectively) are true. Though I use 
distinct styles of variables for these objects, I use sentential operators 
instead of set-theoretic notation (so for instance, I will write ∼ A instead 
of 𝐀). With these conventions in place, the alternatives to A are non-
empty mutually exclusive propositions (some authors require the 
alternatives to be exhaustive: this will not be necessary here).  
The informal insight that motivates contrastivists is that competent 
speakers of English accept ⌜ It ought to be that A⌝  exactly when A is 
better than the alternatives.  
Actualism is a thesis about what grounds such comparisons. I 																																																								
5 See Angelika Kratzer “The Notional Category of Modality” in H. J. Eikmeyer & H. 
Rieser, eds., Words, worlds, and contexts: New approaches in word semantics (Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 1981)  38–74 and Angelika Kratzer, Modal and Conditionals  (Oxford & New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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sketched the view in the introduction, but it is important to be a bit 
more precise. Let us start by getting clear about the ingredients of the 
actualist semantics. First, for every A, there must be a unique world w 
such that w is the closest A-world to the actual world (w is an A-world 
iff w ∈ A). When this relationship holds, I say that w is the representative 
of A (relative to the actual world). The second ingredient is a partial 
order ≻  defined on individual worlds.6 This partial order captures the 
relative goodness of worlds. Finally, say that ⌜ought A⌝  is true relative 
to {A, A1, …, Ak} just in case the representative of A is better (in the 
sense of ≻ ) than the representative of any other alternative.  
As noted, Jackson motivates actualism on the basis of 
counterexamples to basic inference patterns involving ought, 
specifically:  
 
Conjunctive Inheritance: ought(A & B) ⊨ ought(A)  
Agglomeration: ought(A), ought(B) ⊨ ought(A&B)  
 
It is useful to separate two elements of Jackson’s challenge: the empirical 
claim is that these principles have intuitive counterexamples. The 
theoretical claim is that the actualist semantics predicts that they fail.  
My focus is squarely on the theoretical claim—specifically, on what 
it takes to make it true. Nonetheless, some remarks on the emprical 
claim are in order. The attack on Inheritance is based on cases like 
Professor Procrastinate—who ought to accept a commitment to write a 
book review and write the review, but ought not to accept the 
commitment, for if he accepts, he will not write.7 Procrastinate cases 
are controversial and extensively discussed (again, I am setting aside 
whether they are convincing).8  
																																																								
6 A partial order is a transitive, reflexive and anti-symmetric relation. One could 
assume that ≻  has more structure than this, but that will not be necessary. 7	Jackson, “On the Semantics and Logic of Obligation”, p. 193	
8  Even just focusing on very recent literature, variants of Prof. Procrastinate are 
discussed in Fabrizio Cariani “Ought and Resolutions Semantics,” Noûs 47 (2013) 534-
558, Justin Snedegar “Contrastive Semantics for Deontic Modals,” in Martin Blauw, 
ed., Contrastivism in Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2012), Daniel Lassiter Measurement 
and Modality: The Scalar Basis of Modal Semantics, PhD Thesis, NYU (2012), Daniel 
Lassiter “Modality, Scale Structure, and Scalar Reasoning,” Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly, 94 4 (2014) 461-490, Kai von Fintel “The best we can (expect to) get? 
Challenges to the classical semantics for deontic modals,” (2012) available at 
http://mit.edu/fintel/fintel-2012-apa-ought.pdf, Aaron Bronfman and Janice Dowell 
“Contextualism about Deontic Modals,” in Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman, 
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As for counterexamples to Agglomeration, Jackson adapts a 
variation on a case from Goldman (op. cit. §IX). 9 Here is Jackson’s 
description of the case:  
 
Swerving Chariots: Attila and Genghis are driving their 
chariots towards each other. If neither swerves, there will 
be a collision; if both swerve, there will be a worse 
collision [...]; but if one swerves and the other does not, 
there will be no collision. Moreover if one swerves, the 
other will not because neither wants a collision. 
Unfortunately, it is also true to an even greater extent that 
neither wants to be ‘chicken’; as a result what actually 
happens is that neither swerves and there is a collision. It 
ought to be that Attila swerves, for then there would be no 
collision. [...] Equally it ought to be that Genghis swerves. But it 
ought not to be that both swerve, for then we get a worse 
collision.10  
 
I italicized Jackson’s interpretation of the case. For a variety of reasons, 
I am skeptical that this is the correct diagnosis. There is room to 
diagnose the counterexample as turning on a slight equivocation: even 
if all three ought claims are interpreted as objective ought-to-be claims, 
they need not trade on the same contextual sources of value.11 I will not 
pursue this criticism here, however. My response to Swerving Chariots 																																																								
eds., Deontic Modality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), and Frank 
Jackson “Procrastinate Revisited,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2014) 634-647. 
9  If Jackson is right about Procrastinate cases, they would also be failures of 
Agglomeration.  
(i) Procrastinate ought to accept and write. 
(ii) Procrastinate ought not to accept. 
(iii) Procrastinate ought to (accept and write and not to accept.)  
(i) and (ii) sound jointly acceptable. By contrast, (iii) is contradictory. The 
counterexample I discuss in the main text purports to show something stronger: that 
agglomeration can fail even when the prejacent of the conclusion is consistent.  
10 Jackson “On the Semantics and Logic of Obligation”, p.189.	
11 The context sensitivity I noted in §1 is relevant to develop this alternative diagnosis. 
See also the discussion of similar cases in §5.4.3 of John F. Horty Agency and Deontic 
Logic (NY & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), and §11.5.2 of his “Perspectival 
Act Utilitarianism,” in Patrick Girard, Mathieu Marion and Olivier Roy, eds., Dynamic 
Formal Epistemology (Dordrecht: Springer, Synthese Library vol 351, 2011) 197–222. 
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will be indirect: even assuming that Jackson’s diagnosis is correct, it can 
be challenged on the basis of its consequences.  
Let us move, then, to the theoretical claim. To vindicate this, an 
actualist must characterize a logical consequence relation that fits the 
semantics. The point should be obvious: to establish that actualism 
invalidates Agglomeration and Inheritance, one needs to know what ‘⊨’ 
means. As I explain in the next two sections, what I have said so far 
about actualism is compatible with very different consequence 
relations.  
Before presenting these consequence relations, let me comment on 
some additional logical desiderata that an actualist account should 
meet. Jackson notes that actualists might want to validate:  
 
Negation Extraction: ought(∼ A) ⊨ ∼ ought(A)12  
 
Incidentally, this emphasizes that the actualist’s rejection of 
Agglomeration is not based on the possibility of deontic conflicts. In 
addition, actualists endorse some multi-modal inferences—at least 
trivial sounding ones:  
 
Intensional Invariance: ought(A), necessarily(A iff B) ⊨ ought(B)  
Possibility: ought(A) ⊨ possibly(A)  
 
The last desirable inference pattern I highlight will be crucial to my 
argument: 
 
Weakening: ought(A), ought(B) ⊨	ought(A ∨ B)  
 
It is natural to view Weakening as a weakening of Agglomeration. In 
fact, if ⌜ought(A&B)⌝  entails ⌜ought(A ∨  B)⌝  and the consequence 
relation is transitive, Weakening follows from Agglomeration. 13 
Moreover, if the consequence relation is monotonic (that is, if adding 
premises preserves consequence), Weakening is entailed by (but does 
not entail) a general form of Inheritance—the claim that ought is closed 
under necessary entailment. Of course, actualists reject both 
Agglomeration and Inheritance, but that is compatible with accepting 																																																								
12 Jackson “On the Semantics and Logic of Obligation”, p.187.	
13 Actualists will not be moved by this because they deny that ⌜ought(A&B)⌝  entails ⌜ought(A	∨	B)⌝ .  
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Weakening. The next section establishes that, given the most natural 
characterization of the consequence relation, actualist semantics does 
not validate Weakening.  
III LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE  
How should an actualist define logical consequence? A very simple 
approach starts with the Kaplanian idea that logical consequence for 
context-dependent expressions is preservation of truth at a context.14 
This account is appropriate in this theoretical setting because actualism 
treats ought as a context dependent expression: the semantic value of 
ought depends on several features of context: which world is actual, 
what is the closeness relation and which worlds are better than which 
others.  
 
Definition 1 (Logical Consequence) A1,..., Ak ⊨ B iff there is no context 
c such that all of the Ai are true at c but B is false at c.15  
 
Given this definition, the actualist’s task is to characterize truth at 
a context for ought-sentences. In turn, this requires her to say more 
about how the parameters she uses in her compositional semantics 
depend on context.  
A simple model of context views each context as a quadruple of 
the form á@,≻ ,s,Altñ. In each quadruple, @ is the actual world, ≻  is the 
partial order that models relative goodness of worlds, s is a selection 
function that, given as inputs a proposition A and a world w, outputs 
the closest A-world to the actual world, and finally Alt is a set of 
alternatives (that is, a set of mutually exclusive non-empty 
propositions).  
This model of context entails that, within a fixed context, no two 
sentences can be evaluated against different alternatives, and, for this 																																																								
14 See pp. 522-523 of David Kaplan “On Demonstratives,” in Joseph Almog, John Perry 
and Howard Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan (New York & Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989). One might, alternatively, formulate the actualist semantic 
theory as a Kripke-semantics for a modal logic with a deontic operator. Given such a 
formulation, one can leverage a standard model-theoretic analysis of consequence 
(e.g. preservation of validity in a frame). This approach has the advantage of allowing 
the use of standard techniques to study the metatheoretic properties of the semantics. 
The disadvantage is that it requires quite a bit of technical setup I will not need.   
15 I have simplified Kaplan’s definition by avoiding quantification over structures. 
None of my results are affected by this layer of complexity.  
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reason, it does not work well with actualism. Actualism requires:  
 
Prejacent Representation: the alternative set against which ⌜ought A⌝  is evaluated must include the set of worlds at which A 
is true.  
 
Following established terminology, the prejacent of ⌜ought A⌝  is the 
sentence A. It follows from Prejacent Representation that there is no 
set of alternatives (and hence, on the present view, no context) that 
allows simultaneous evaluation of:  
 
(2) It ought to be that Attila swerves    
(3) It ought to be that Genghis swerves    
(4) It ought to be that (Attila swerves and Gengis swerves).    
 
There is no alternative set that includes the prejacents of (2), (3) and 
(4). Here is why: if the prejacents of (2) and (3) are not understood as 
incompatible with each other, then they cannot belong to the same 
alternative set. If they are, then their conjunction is a contradiction. If 
so, the prejacent of (4) does not belong to the alternative set (since 
every member of the alternative set is a non-empty proposition). This 
reasoning generalizes to every non-trivial instance of Agglomeration.16  
To avoid this problem, actualists must abandon the claim that 
context alone determines a set of alternatives. Instead, they must hold 
that context plus the prejacent of a given ought-sentence determines the 
set of alternatives against which that particular sentence is evaluated.17 																																																								
16  Justin Snedegar argues persuasively that any contrastivist must recognize the 
existence of cross-contextual reasoning, and with it some kind of cross-contextual 
account of acceptability of inferences. While I agree with Snedegar’s claim, I reject the 
further claim (which to my knowledge Snedegar does not make) that this cross-
contextual notion is the only notion involved in accounting for the validity and 
invalidity of inferences involving ought. See, Justin Snedegar “Deontic Reasoning 
Across Contexts,” in Fabrizio Cariani, Davide Grossi, Joke Meheus and Xavier Parent, 
eds., Deontic Logic and Normative Systems. Proceedings of DEON 2014 (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2014). 
17 See §2.2 of Wes Holliday’s “Fallibilism and Multiple Paths To Knowledge”, in 
Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne, Oxford Studies in Epistemology vol. 5 (NY & 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 97-144, for a similar distinction in the context 
of relevant alternatives accounts of knowledge. Holliday distinguishes theories that 
make the set of relevant alternatives dependent on the choice of proposition, as in 
Fred Dretske’s “The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge,” in Philosophical Studies 40, 
3 (1981) 363-378,  from theories that view the set of relevant alternatives as 
determined directly by context, as in Mark Heller’s “Relevant Alternatives and 
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 In other words, each context may ‘host’ different alternative sets 
(to be used depending on the prejacent of the given ought-sentence). 
Given this approach, it is possible to evaluate all of (2), (3) and (4) 
within a single context c. To formally implement this idea, model 
contexts as quadruples á@,≻ ,s,mñ with m a function from prejacents to 
alternatives. Call this function the alternatives mapping.  
Not every function from prejacents to alternatives can count as an 
alternatives mapping, or else almost every argument will be invalid. 
Consider, for instance, the Negation Extraction pattern: ought(∼ A) ⊨ 
∼ ought(A) (recall that Jackson thinks actualism validates this). If the 
premise is evaluated relative to {~A,B} and the ought-sentence in the 
conclusion is evaluated relative to {A,C} for some unrelated C, the 
argument might fail. After all, the representative of A could be better 
than the representative of C even if the representative of ~A was better 
than the representative of B. The validity of Negation Extraction 
requires that the alternatives to A and the alternatives to ∼ A somehow 
be related.  
Actualists need constraints on the alternatives mapping even for 
the inference patterns that are intended to fail (like Agglomeration). 
The failure of these patterns should not be grounded only in how 
alternatives are determined. The actualist semantics should play some 
role in explaining why they fail.18  
Jackson is very clear about which alternatives mapping he favors: 
“I think that typically when we assert that it ought to be that A, we 
mean that it ought to be that A out of A and its negation”.19 Let’s give 
this a name: 
 
Simple Mapping: map the prejacent A to the alternative set {A, 
∼ A}.  
 
The simple mapping can be justified on grounds of simplicity (it is the 
simplest way of explaining how contrastive alternatives are generated) 
and generality (it applies to any prejacent without ad hoc stipulations).20 																																																								
Closure,” in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77, 2 (1999) 197-208.  
18 Without constraints on the alternatives mapping, Agglomeration would fail even 
for the actualist’s main opponents—the possibilists who maintain that the 
representative of A is the best possible A-world (regardless of closeness).  
19 Jackson “On the Semantics and Logic of Obligation”, p.187.	
20 As defined in the main text, the simple mapping is context invariant. It can be made 
context dependent by adding another parameter to our representation of context. Let 
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Putting these ideas together yields a theoretical package consisting 
of four items: the actualist semantics, the thesis that logical 
consequence is preservation of truth at a context, the thesis that (fixing 
a context) we can associate different alternative sets to different 
prejacents, and finally the simple mapping.  
It is easy to check that this package yields the verdicts that 
motivate the actualist. Inheritance and Agglomeration are invalid. 
Negation extraction is valid, as are the basic multi-modal patterns 
(Intensional Invariance and Possibility).  
However, and crucially, Weakening fails. That is, there are 
contexts in which ⌜ought(A)⌝  and ⌜ought(B)⌝  are both true but ⌜ought(A	∨ B)⌝  is false. 
  
Counterexample to Weakening: The following assignments 
are sufficient to fix a context in which the premises are 
true and the conclusion is false (in the Closeness column 
"0" labels the actual world).  
 
Possibility Representative Closeness Goodness 
A&B wA,B 1 best 
A&~B wA,~B 2 worst 
~A&B w~A,B 0 tied for second 
~A&~B w~A,~B 3 tied for second 
 
In this context, ⌜ought(A)⌝  is true because wA,B, which represents A, is 
the best world; ⌜ought(B)⌝  is true because the actual world, which 
represents B, is better than the representative of ∼ B (which is wA,~B). 
However, ⌜ought(A ∨ B)⌝   is false, because the representative of the 
disjunction is the actual world and the representative of its negation is 
w~A,~B and these worlds are equally good.21  																																																								
fC be a set of worlds consisting of all the worlds that are relevant in c.  
Contextualist Simple Mapping: For every context c, for each prejacent A in 
context c, let the alternative set be {fC Ç A, fC Ç ~A}  
None of my findings depend on the choice between these two implementations of the 
simple mapping. For simplicity, I always discuss the context invariant one.  
21  An anonymous referee and Ben Lennertz independently asked an interesting 
question about this counterexample: given that the actual world verifies ~𝐴&𝐵 , 
shouldn’t the closest ~B-world be w~A,~B rather than wA,~B. After all, both w~A,~B and 
the actual world verify ~𝐴. In response, I highlight two points: first, it is plausible that 
similarity between worlds depends on global features of the given worlds more so 
than on local features. That is to say: how matters are beyond A and B, might be more 
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The invalidity of Weakening is a serious problem for the simple 
actualist package I put together. Though the actualist’s motivation 
might warrant a non-normal modal logic, it does not warrant a logic 
this weak. Weakening is an eminently plausible principle and no 
example has been offered in the literature to justify its failure. Note, 
incidentally, that the intuitions in Swerving Chariots do not support the 
failure of Weakening. The sentence “It ought to be that (either Genghis 
or Attila swerves)” is generally judged true in the context. Moreover, 
the actualist semantics predicts this sentence to be true, so the intuitive 
pull against Weakening cannot possibly come from Swerving Chariots.  
In response, the actualist must either bite the bullet and reject 
Weakening (in addition to Agglomeration) or avoid the package I set 
up. In the next section, I consider a way of modifying the theoretical 
package that can restore the validity of Weakening (but at a cost).  
To further motivate this alternative package, it is useful to 
consider a second problem for the current version of actualism. The 
problem is that, by lumping together the alternatives to a prejacent into 
a single alternative, the simple mapping forces some mistaken 
predictions.22   
 
Harry’s Mischief. Suppose that Harry has three options. In 
order of goodness of their representative world, he can (S) 
go to school or (V) play videogames at home or (L) 
shoplift at the nearby mall. Suppose also that in the actual 
world he shoplifts at the mall. Suppose also that the 
representative of V is closer to the actual world than the 
representative of S.  
 
A diagrammatic representation of the example helps illustrate some of 
the key points. The three depicted worlds are the representatives of 
																																																								
important for establishing similarity relations. Moreover, even at the local level, wA,~B 
and w~A,B are alike in that they both verify 𝐴 ≡ ~𝐵 , which is false in w~A,~B. The 
closeness ordering in the counterexample might arise if 𝐴 ≡ ~𝐵  were to be an 
important dimension of closeness (more important than ~𝐴).	
22  This style of objection is independently due to Jacob Ross “Actualism, Possibilism 
and Beyond”, Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 2 (2013) 74-96 and to a 2009 blog post 
by Ralph Wedgwood titled “Against Actualism” (available at 
http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2009/09/against-actualism.html).  
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each alternative. The actual world is depicted as a circle. Spatial 
proximity represents closeness to the actual world. Relative goodness 
is represented by ≺  (higher is better).   
The current implementation of actualism implies counter-
intuitively that Harry ought to play videogames at home, because the 
representative of V is better than the representative of ∼ V.  
The problem is that the good S-world is, so to speak, hidden 
behind the non-ideal representative of ∼ V which happens to be actual. 
Incidentally, the actualist package also implies that Harry ought to go 
to school, the representative of this alternative is better than the 
representative of its negation. The upshot is that actualism views 
Harry’s Mischief as a situation in which two incompatible things ought 
to be. Maybe some deontic conflicts are like this, but it is implausible 
that Harry’s Mischief is a deontic conflict.  
In fact, the above reasoning shows that things are a bit worse than 
I’ve suggested: according to the current actualist package, one ought to 
do each of the things that are better than what one in fact does. If one 
will, in fact, lethally poison 100 cats, then for each n < 100, one ought 
to lethally poison exactly n cats.  
The problem has a clear source: what matters to the truth of ⌜ought(A)⌝  is how A compares with each individual alternative. By 
lumping together the alternatives that are incompatible with A, one 
might lose sight of an alternative that undermines the claim that A 
ought to be the case (in Harry’s case: going to school). I am going to 
call this the lumping problem.  
In the next section, I discuss whether the lumping problem and 
the invalidity of Weakening can be avoided by moving away from the 
simple mapping.  
IV ACTUALISM AND THE FINE MAPPING  
Actualists can solve the lumping problem by contrasting the 
representative of A with the representative of each individual 
alternative to A.23 According to the resulting view, ⌜ought(A)⌝  is true 																																																								
23 Justin Snedegar independently identified a version of this response to the lumping 
	Represents	~V	
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in context c iff the representative of A is better than the representative 
of each alternative to A in c.  
This idea allows an actualist-friendly account of Harry’s Mischief: 
it is not the case that Harry ought to stay at home and play videogames. 
After all, the representative of V is not better than the representative of 
S (which is an alternative in its own right). Moving away from the 
simple mapping requires us to say something about how alternatives 
are generated and distinguished in context (this will result in a more 
complex package).  
Start with the idea that each context determines a background set 
of alternatives. Very roughly, the background alternatives in c are all the 
possibilities that are worth distinguishing in c. Depending on which 
reading of ought is salient, ‘worth distinguishing’ may mean something 
slightly different. Since it is up to the actualist to tell a full story here, I 
will not try to say more. I will, however, offer some examples for 
determinacy’s sake. In Swerving Chariots, the background alternatives 
must distinguish between the worlds in which Attila swerves and the 
worlds in which he does not (and similarly for Genghis). By contrast, 
in that context, the background alternatives need not distinguish the 
worlds in which Attila swerves while yelling "yee-hah!" from worlds in 
which he swerves without yelling at all. Similarly, in Harry’s Mischief, 
the background alternatives should distinguish the three possible 
courses of actions available to Harry, but, for the purposes of the 
conversation, they need not distinguish finer possibilities.  
There is no guarantee that the background alternatives can be 
deployed in evaluating a given ought-sentence. This is because the 
background alternatives need not satisfy Prejacent Representation. 
However, given an ought-sentence with prejacent A, and an appropriate 
set ℬ of background alternatives, it is possible to transform ℬ into a 
new set ℬ4  that does satisfy Prejacent Representation. Model each 
context as a quadruple: á@,≻ ,s, ℬñ  where ℬ is a background set of 
alternatives. Then claim that ⌜ought(A)⌝  in context c with background 
alternative set ℬ  
 
• presupposes that A is a union of members of ℬ.  
• Is evaluated against: ℬ4 ={A} ∪ {B ∈ ℬ | B is incompatible with A}   																																																								
problem and spelled it out in his unpublished manuscript “Ought and Options”. 
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In algorithm form: check that A is a union of alternatives in ℬ; if it is, 
collect the alternatives compatible with A into a single alternative, and 
then compare that single alternative against all the remaining 
alternatives. Call this the fine mapping. 
Because the present account introduces presuppositions as part of 
the meaning of ought, the notion of logical consequence requires a 
tweak. We need something like what von Fintel (1999) calls ‘Strawson 
Entailment.’24  
 
Definition 2 A1,…,Ak ⊨S B iff there is no context c such that (i) all of the 
presuppositions of each of the Ai’s and of the conclusion B are satisfied in c (ii) all 
of the Ai are true at c but (iii) B is false at c.  
 
Our new theoretical package then is this: actualism, the modified 
notion of logical consequence, the modeling of contexts as quadruples 
of the form á@,≻ ,s,	ℬñ, where ℬ is a background set of alternatives, and 
finally the recipe for turning ℬ into ℬ4.  
There is much that is of interest in this package. It invalidates 
Inheritance for the reason Jackson wants. It validates Negation 
Extraction, and most surprisingly it validates Weakening. The lumping 
problem is also avoided (by design): it is false that Harry ought to play 
videogames at home, since going to school is better.  
The problem with this package is that it is not faithful to the 
actualist’s motivation. Somewhat surprisingly, it validates 
Agglomeration. Proving this requires working through details that are 
best relegated to a note.25 However, we can observe at a reasonably non-																																																								
24 Kai von Fintel “NPI Licensing, Strawson Entailment and Context Dependency,” 
Journal of Semantics, 16, 2(1999): 97-148. The name is due to remarks by Strawson in 
“On Referring,” in Mind 59 235 (1950) 320-344. Strawson discusses notion of logical 
consequence that is appropriate to a setting in which proper names carry existence 
presuppositions. I have adapted Strawson entailment to the idea of logical 
consequence as preservation of truth at a context. 
25 Suppose for a contradiction that there is a context c such that (i) ⌜ought(A)⌝  is true 
in c, (ii) ⌜ought(B)⌝  is true in c and (iii) ⌜ought(A&B)⌝  is false in c. Suppose also that 
A, B and A&B are all unions of alternatives in the background alternative set of c, so 
that all the relevant presuppositions are satisfied. Because of (i), the representative of 
A, wA, is better than the representatives of each alternative that is incompatible with 
A. Because of (ii), the representative of B, wB, is better than the representatives of 
each alternative that is incompatible with B. We consider two cases: in case 1, wA is the closest A&B-world. In case 2, wA is the closest A&∼ B-world. These cases are exhaustive because we assume that the closest A-world is either the closest A&B-
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technical level that the current package does not predict that 
Agglomeration should fail in Swerving Chariots. The premises of 
Swerving Chariots are now both false in the given context: the 
representative of Attila’s swerving is not better than the representatives 
of each of the other alternatives, because it is not better than the 
representative of the worlds in which Attila does not swerve but 
Genghis does. This falsifies (2). Parallel reasoning establishes the falsity 
of (3). 
This package forces significant revisions of the actualist’s claims 
about logic. Actualists who are willing to give up the attack on 
Agglomeration can adopt the fine mapping and avoid both of the 
problems discussed in §3. However, my criticism of the actualist’s 
challenge to Agglomeration stands: none of the packages I considered 
manages to invalidate Agglomeration while validating Weakening.  
 
V EXPECTED VALUE CONTRASTIVISM INVALIDATES 
WEAKENING  
The investigation can be extended to other contrastive theories. I 
consider two such theories. In this section, I consider views that 
combine contrastivism with the idea that alternatives ought to be 
																																																								
world or the closest A&~B-world.  
Case 1: wA is the closest A&B-world. Then wA would also be the representative of A&B, which by (iii) is not better than all the incompatible alternatives. We know from (i) 
that wA is better than the representatives of alternatives that entail ∼ A. It follows that the representative of ∼ (A&B), which is no worse than wA, is the representative of 
some alternative that entails A&∼ B. Call this w’. We must have that it is not the case 
that wA ≻  w’. However we know that wB ≻  w’, because wB is better than the representatives of each alternative to B (any alternative that entails A&∼ B is an 
alternative to B). Now wB is either the closest A&B-world or the closest ∼ A & B-world. In the first case, we have wA = wB, so that is a contradiction (since we know that wA ≻  w’ is false). In the second case, wB ≺  wA (by (i)) and that is also incompatible with the falsity of wA ≻  w’.  
Case 2: wA is the closest A&∼ B-world. Because of (ii), the representative of B (call it wB) must be better than wA  (i.e. wB ≻  wA). If wB were the representative of ∼ A & B, then ⌜ought A⌝   would be false (because wB ≻  wA). So wB must be the representative of A&B. But then ⌜ought(A&B)⌝  must be true, because wB is better than wA, and also better than the representatives of any alternative incompatible with A (because wA must be better than any such alternative or else ⌜ought(A)⌝   would not be true). Each 
case is contradictory, so the assignment must be impossible. 
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compared on the basis of their expected values.26 Such views are, in a 
sense, natural complements to actualism. One might view actualism as 
a contrastive account of the objective ought, and expectational theories 
as contrastive accounts of the subjective ought.27  
Given a numerical distribution of value over individual worlds, one 
can calculate the expected value of a set of worlds. The expected value 
of A, written EV (A), is the average of the value of the worlds w that 
belong to A weighed by Pr(w|A). 28  It is an elementary fact that 
expected values are not monotonic, in the sense that there are A, B such 
that A ⊂ B, but EV(B) ≤ EV(A). Additionally, the expectation of a 
conjunction, EV(A&B), can be significantly below both of EV(A) and 
EV(B) 
A contrastive account of ought can be built on the notion of 
expected value: ⌜ought(A)⌝   is true in context c just in case the expected 
value of A is greater than the expected value of each of the other 
alternatives in c. 29 Once again, we can complete the theoretical package 
with the simple mapping or with the fine mapping. Let us start with 																																																								
26 See Lou Goble “Utilitarian Deontic Logic,” in Philosophical Studies 82 (1996) 317-
357; Daniel Lassiter Measurement and Modality: the Scalar Basis of Modal Semantics PhD 
thesis, NYU (2011). I emphasize that the analysis in this section only applies to 
accounts that are contrastive in the sense that ⌜ought(A)⌝  is true iff A is better than 
the alternatives.  There are expected value accounts that reject this form of 
contrastivism and do not fall prey to the objections I level in this section: see Ralph 
Wedgwood “Subjective and Objective Ought,” in N. Charlow & M. Chrisman, eds., 
Deontic Modals (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). I have 
formulated a broader critique of these views in Fabrizio Cariani “Deontic Modals and 
Probabilities: One Theory to Rule Them All?”, in Charlow and Chrisman, eds., Deontic 
Modality, op. cit., pp. 11-46.  
27 Frank Jackson “Procrastinate Revisited,” in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 4 (2014) 
634-647. 
28 There are other ways of calculating expected values: this is how Goble, op. cit. does 
it. It suffices to make all the necessary points. 
29 Expectational contrastivists presuppose something that some decision theorists 
find philosophically dubious (even if mathematically trivial): namely that one can 
compute expected values of arbitrary conjunctions and disjunctions. For example, it 
presupposes that, in addition to the expected value of “Joe runs” and the expected 
value of “Joe jumps”, we can also calculate the expected value of “Joe runs or jumps”. 
This seems to presuppose that it is intelligible to talk about the prior probability of 
the free action of an agent even in the context of deliberation. For challenges to this 
idea, see Isaac Levi “Rationality, Prediction, and Autonomous Choice,” Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 19 suppl. (1989) 339-363, Isaac Levi “Review Essay The Foundations 
of Causal Decision Theory,” in this JOURNAL,  97 374 (2000).  For replies, see Wlodek 
Rabinowicz “Does Practical Deliberation Crowd Out Self-Prediction?,” Erkenntnis 57 
(2002) 91-122 and James M. Joyce “Levi on Causal Decision Theory and the Possibility 
of Predicting One’s Own Actions,” in  Philosophical Studies, 110 (2002) 69-102. 
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‘Simple Expectational Contrastivism’ (SEC for short). This is the view 
that ⌜ought(A)⌝  is true in context c iff EV(A)>EV (∼ A).30 
A simple model of context that fits this view treats each context 
as a quadruple of the form á@,Pr,v,mñ. In each quadruple, @ is the 
actual world, Pr a probability function, v a value function and m the 
simple mapping. (Further bells and whistles are usually added, but they 
are not necessary here.)  
As far as our desiderata go, SEC behaves similarly to the simple 
version of actualism. It invalidates Agglomeration and Inheritance, 
while validating Negation Extraction and the multi-modal patterns.  
It also runs into two familiar problems: first, it invalidates 
Weakening. There are contexts in which EV(A)>EV (∼ A), EV(B)>EV 
(∼ B), but EV(A Ú B)≤EV(∼ (A Ú B)).   
 
Counterexample to Weakening for SEC: There is a context 
á@,Pr,v,mñ that makes the premises of Weakening true 
and its conclusion false. Consider P r and v such that:  
 
A B Pr EV ⊤ ⊤ .25 100 ⊤ ⊥ .25 -50 ⊥ ⊤ .25 -50 ⊥ ⊥ .25 0 
 
In this context, EV(A) = 25, while EV(∼ A) = −25, making ⌜ought(A)⌝  
true. Similarly, EV(B) = 25, while EV(∼ B) = −25, making ⌜ought(B)⌝  
true. Finally, EV(A Ú B) = 0 = EV(∼ (A Ú B)), making ⌜ought(A Ú B)⌝  
false.  
SEC also shares the lumping problem with the simple version of 
actualism. By lumping together the alternatives to a prejacent into a 
single alternative, SEC predicts the truth of too many ought-sentences. 
  
Harry’s Expectational Mischief. There are three possible 
things Harry might do: he can (S) go to school or (V) play 
videogames at home or (L) shoplift at the nearby mall.  																																																								
30 To an approximation, this is the account of Goble op. cit. and Lassiter op. cit.. 
Lassiter’s variant requires the expected value of A to significantly exceed the expected 
value of ∼ A. This does not matter to any of the results to follow.  
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alternative Pr EV 
S 1/3 10 
V 1/3 -5 
L 1/3 -50 
 
The particular numbers do not matter very much. What matters is that 
SEC implies counterintuitively that Harry ought to play videogames at 
home, since V is better than ∼ V (note: EV (∼ V) = .5·10+.5·−50 = 
−20). In addition, like actualism, SEC also predicts that Harry ought to 
go to school—effectively, treating Harry’s case as a moral dilemma of 
sorts (which it clearly is not).  
Harry’s Expectational Mischief shows that the expectational 
contrastivist is best served by adopting something like the fine mapping 
instead. According to the resulting view, ⌜ought(A)⌝  is true in c just in 
case the expected value of A is greater than the expected value of each 
of the alternatives. In §4, I noted that actualism plus the fine mapping 
validates Agglomeration and Weakening. This does not happen in the 
context of expected value contrastivism. Both patterns remain invalid 
even if we move to the fine mapping. The counterexample to 
Weakening is, in fact, a simple extension of the one that worked for 
SEC.31  
The upshot is this: like actualists, expectational contrastivists 
cannot invalidate Agglomeration without also invalidating Weakening. 
But invalidating Weakening is implausible (at any rate, expectational 
contrastivists have never tried justifying it). This undermines their case 
against Agglomeration and raises the question: is it even possible to 
invalidate Agglomeration without invalidating Weakening? To answer 
this question, I consider one last kind of contrastive theory.  
																																																								
31 Counterexample to Weakening: Consider the context set out in counterexample against 
SEC and add the background alternative set,  
{A&B, A&∼ B, ∼ A&B, ∼ A&∼ B} 
Establishing ⌜ought(A)⌝ , ⌜ought(B)⌝ ,   ⌜~(ought(A Ú B))⌝  requires a few new 
checks. Note that the presuppositions of all the ought-sentences are satisfied by the 
context. In the original example, EV(A) = 25, which exceeds both EV(∼ A & B) and 
EV(∼ A & ∼ B). Similarly, EV(B) = 25 which exceeds both EV(A & ∼ B) and EV(∼ A 
& ∼ B). Finally, EV(A Ú B) = 0, which falsifies the conclusion, because EV(∼ (A Ú B)) 
= 0 as well.  
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VI END-RELATIONAL CONTRASTIVISM  
The last contrastive theory I consider is what Stephen Finlay calls the 
end-relational analysis. 32  End-relationalism relativizes the truth-
conditions of ought-sentences to a probability function Pr and an end E. 
There are a couple ways of spelling out this insight: 
 
Inverse end-relationalism. ⌜ought(A)⌝  is true relative to {A, 
A1,..., Ak } iff Pr𝐀|𝐄 > 𝑃𝑟 𝑨𝒊 𝐄  for each 𝑖 ∈ 1, … , 𝑘    
 
Direct end-relationalism. ⌜ought(A)⌝  is true relative to {A, 
A1,..., Ak } iff Pr 𝐄|𝐀 > Pr 𝐄 𝐀𝐢  for each 𝑖 ∈ 1, … , 𝑘    
 
Simplifying a bit, on the first version, what matters is the probability of  
each option given the relevant ends. On the second, what matters is the 
probability of the end given the relevant options. Finlay’s official 
account of ought in a sense involves both versions. According to him, 
the truth-conditions of deontic ought are effectively approximated by 
Direct end-relationalism. However, the most general lexical entry for 
ought, regardless of interpretation, is the Inverse account (which Finlay 
deems more adequate for sentences like “It ought to rain”).  To swap 
the direction of the conditional probabilities, he adds the assumption 
that in deontic interpretations every option must have the same prior 
probability (he calls this Symmetry of Choice).33  
Like the previous theories, end-relationalism is meant to make 
predictions about inferences, but rarely, if ever, accompanied by a 
definition of logical consequence. As in those cases, we hypothesize 
that logical consequence is preservation of truth at a context. Once 
again, then, we must get clear about what contexts look like for end-
relationalists. At a minimum, contexts must contain, in addition to the 
																																																								
32 See Stephen Finlay, “Ought and Ends,” in Philosophical Studies 143 3 (2009) 315-
340; Stephen Finlay, Confusion of Tongues (New York & Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014); Stephen Finlay “Ought: Out of Order” in N. Charlow  & M. Chrisman, 
eds., Deontic Modals (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
33 For a much more thorough explanation, see Finlay Confusion of Tongues, op cit., §3.6. 
I have criticized Symmetry of Choice in Fabrizio Cariani “Epistemic and Deontic 
Should,” in Thought 2 1 (2013) 73-84. For Finlay’s replies to some of my objections, 
see his “Ought: Out of Order”, op. cit..  
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actual world, a probability function Pr and an end E.34 As above, we can 
construct two implementations of end-relationalism depending on 
whether we use the simple or the fine mapping. To keep the variety of 
theories to a minimum I will only talk about versions of the view that 
use the simple mapping.  
At first sight, it might look that Inverse End-Relationalism might 
do better. First, it validates a general form of Inheritance.35  
 
Inheritance: if A ⊆ B, ought(A) ⊨ ought(B).  
 
Given Inheritance, Weakening is a small step away. If the consequence 
relation is monotonic, one can trivially reason from a less general, 
disjunctive version of Inheritance to Weakening.  
 
Disjunctive Inheritance: ought(B) ⊨ ought(A Ú B)  
Weakening: ought(A),ought(B)	⊨ ought(A	∨ B)  
 
Since both our concepts of logical consequence (Definitions 1 and 2) 
are monotonic, Weakening follows.36 Despite validating Weakening, 
Inverse End-Relationalism invalidates Agglomeration.37  
One might think, then, that Inverse End-Relationalism is a 																																																								
34 Strictly speaking, Finlay denies this. He prefers to say that contexts contain a 
qualitative information state I (e.g. a set of worlds) and that I determines a probability 
function Pr. This difference is irrelevant to the present argument. 
35 In the case of the simple mapping variant, this follows because if A ⊆ B and Pr(A | 
E) > Pr(∼ A | E), we must also have that Pr(B | E) > P r (∼ B | E). In the case of the 
fine mapping variant, if Pr(A | E) > Pr(C | E) for each alternative C to A, we must 
also have that Pr (B | E) > Pr(D | E) for each alternative D to B. The reason is that 
the alternatives to B (according to the fine mapping) form a subset of the alternatives 
to A and, by the probability calculus Pr(B | E) ≥ Pr(A | E).  
36 The assumption of monotonicity of the consequence relation has been challenged 
by researchers in the dynamic semantics tradition. Iin the context of deontic modality, 
see for instance Malte Willer’s “A Note on Iffy Oughts,” this JOURNAL 109  449-461 
and Malte Willer “Dynamic Foundations for Deontic Logic,” in Nate Charlow and 
Matthew Chrisman, eds., Deontic Modality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming). However, the particular instance of monotonicity involved here is very 
unlike the sort of pattern that is challenged by dynamic semanticists. Moreover, end-
relationalism is typically presented in a static framework.  
37 To see how it can fail, consider the following model:  Pr(A&B)=.1; Pr(A&~B)=.45;  
Pr(~A&B)=.45; Pr(~A&~B)=0. Then Pr(A|E) > Pr(∼ A|E) ; Pr(B|E) > 
Pr(∼ B|E),but Pr(A&B|E)>Pr(∼ (A & B) | E). This establishes that Agglomeration 
is invalid for the simple mapping version of Inverse End-Relationalism. The same 
model, but with different inequalities, shows that it fails for the fine mapping version.	
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promising option for those who want to rejection Agglomeration 
because of cases like Swerving Chariots. This is not so: Inverse End-
Relationalism does not predict that Swerving Chariots is a 
counterexample to Agglomeration. Suppose, for instance, that the end 
E is to avoid a collision. Now, if Pr(Attila Swerves|E) = Pr(Genghis 
Swerves|E), then the premises of Swerving Chariots are false. The 
probability that a collision is avoided because Attila but no Genghis 
swerves equals the probability that a collision is avoided because  
Genghis swerves but  Attila does not. On the other hand, if Pr(Attila 
Swerves|E) > Pr(Genghis Swerves|E), it is false that Genghis ought to 
swerve, for after all given the end it is more likely that Attila swerves.  
Let me reiterate that I find these to be reasonable predictions 
about Swerving Chariots. The objection against Inverse end-
relationalism is not that it makes the wrong predictions about Swerving 
Chariots. It is, instead, that it violates Agglomeration but it cannot 
appeal to the standard counterexamples against it. In addition to this, 
the particular way in which Agglomeration fails for Inverse end-
relationalists is not supported by intuitive cases. 
As I mentioned, however, Finlay’s official account of deontic ought 
amounts to Direct end-relationalism. As it turns out, this view is a 
special case of expectational contrastivism (so we can be relatively brief 
in bringing out its logical properties). To see this, suppose that the 
value of a world w is 1 if E is true at w and 0 otherwise. Then, for the 
given value function v and probability Pr: EV(A)= Pr(A|E), where 
EV(•) is the expected value function determined by v and Pr. One might 
then expect that Direct end-relationalism and expectational 
contrastivism determine similar logics. This is exactly what turns out 
to be the case: specifically, both invalidate Agglomeration and 
Weakening (as well as all the versions of Inheritance I discussed in this 
paper).  If, as I maintain, it is imperative to hold on to Weakening, then 
Direct end-relationalism is in as much trouble as the views discussed in 
the previous sections.  
VII CONCLUSIONS  
The central finding of this paper is that there are systematic problems 
in setting up a contrastive theory that (i) invalidates Agglomeration, 
(ii) validates Weakening and (iii) is faithful to the actualist’s motivation 
for invalidating Agglomeration. Actualism, expectational contrastivism 
and Direct end-relationalism generally violate constraint (ii). I built a 
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version of Actualism that satisfies constraint (ii), but the cost is the 
failure of (i) and (iii). Inverse end-relationalism has the distinctive 
advantage of satisfying (i) and (ii), but it violates constraint (iii).  
Interpreting this conclusion requires some care. I do not suggest 
that Agglomeration ought to be generally valid. Many theorists believe 
it should fail in the case of true deontic conflicts. It is remarkable here 
that the logics that are designed to model deontic conflicts do validate 
Weakening even as they invalidate Agglomeration.38   
Neither do I intend these conclusions to be an indictment of the 
contrastive insight that motivated the views I considered here. There 
are contrastive theories that validate Agglomeration and simply deny 
that Swerving Chariots is evidence against Agglomeration. 39 
Furthermore, there may be other ways of characterizing the notion of 
logical consequence I have not considered that satisfy all three 
desiderata (though I think there is reason to doubt this).  
The present discussion also holds a positive moral for contrastivist 
views more generally. Developing a contrastive view requires explicit 
choices about how the alternatives interact with context. In particular, 
contrastivists must be extremely careful in specifying what kind of 
alternatives mapping they choose. Even assuming that logical 
consequence is preservation of truth at a context, the logical properties 
of a contrastive account may vary significantly according to what role is 
assigned to context in determining the set of alternatives that is 
appropriate for a given ought-sentence.  
 
																																																								
38 The suggestion that Agglomeration might be involved in moral dilemmas comes 
from the influential essay by Bernard Williams “Ethical Consistency,” Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society (Supplement), 39 (1965) 103-124. For an example of a logic that 
invalidates Agglomeration, but not Weakening, in the face of moral dilemmas, see the 
proposal of Bas van Fraassen “Values and the Heart’s Command,” this JOURNAL 70 
(1973) 5-19.   
39 I have presented one such theory in Fabrizio Cariani “ ‘Ought’ and Resolution 
Semantics”, op. cit.	
